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The past decade has seen several efforts to amend Section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act,' the primary federal price discrimination stat-
ute. Section 3 proscribes general price discrimination, geographic price
discrimination utilized to destroy competition, and sales at "unreason-
ably low prices" employed to destroy competition or eliminate a com-
petitor.'
This article will be largely concerned with the "unreasonably low
prices" provision of Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. In order
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1926; LL.B., George Washington University Law School, 1929.
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I 15 U.S.C. 13a (1970). Section 3 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or contract
to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser,
in that, any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge is granted
to the purchaser over and above any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising
service charge available at the time of such transaction to said competitors in
respect of a sale of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity; to sell, to contract
to sell, goods in any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted
by said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying corn-
petition, or eliminating a competitor in such . part of the United States; or, to sell,
or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying
competition or eliminating a competitor.
2 The Robinson-Patman Bill, H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), was bitterly
opposed at the time of its passage. Representative Emanuel Celler contended that the bill
was "intended, under cover of devious but innocent appearing wording, to assure profitable
business to a trade regardless of the efficiency of service rendered the consumer . . . ."
H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1936). Representative Celler also argued
that the bill would "result in price raising and, in some cases, actual price fixing." 80
Cong. Rec. 8109 (1936). Section 3 was introduced by Senators Borah and Van Nuys as a
compromise.
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to provide an understanding of the bases of the criticism directed at
section 3 and the attempts to amend that section, the article will begin
with a discussion of the current debate over predatory pricing practices.
Suggested statutory alternatives to section 3 will then be analyzed.
Finally, the article will provide a brief description of a possible alterna-
tive to current enforcement standards suggested by judicial decisions
interpreting the unreasonably low prices provision of section 3.
There are several reasons for current interest in the unreasonably
low prices provision of section 3 and the attempts to amend that section.
First, the Supreme Court, in Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co.,a
held that section 3 is not a part of the antitrust laws as defined in
Section 1 of the Clayton Act; 4
 accordingly the private-action sanctions
of the Clayton Act are not applicable to the "unreasonably low" pricing
conduct prohibited by section 3. Section 3, the Court ruled, "contains
only penal sanctions for the violation of its provisions . . . [and] in
the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary,
these sanctions should . . . be considered exclusive, rather than sup-
plemented by civil sanctions of a distinct statute."' Scrutinizing the
Robinson-Patman Act's legislative history, the Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend Section 3 of that Act to become part of the
Clayton Act, and that the section was not intended to carry more than
criminal sanctions. The Court did, however, state that price discrimina-
tions, "to the extent that they were common to both that section and
§ 2 of the Clayton Act, were also understood to carry, under the in-
dependent force of the Clayton Act, the private remedies provided in
§§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act."'
3 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
4 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970) designates as part of the "antitrust laws" the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970); parts of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8 et seq.
(1970); an act amending the Wilson Tariff Act,,15 U.S.C. § 11 (1970); and the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44, and 29 U.S.C. ft 52-53 (1970).
6 355 U.S. at 377. The Court seemed to be heavily influenced in its decision by the
possibility of abuse inherent in a private cause of action created by what it considered a
rather vague provision—"unreasonably low prices." Id. at 378.
6 Id. at 380. The conference report on the bill noted that
[t]he provisions of section 2 of the House bill were agreed to without
amendment by the Senate .... [I]t appears in the conference report as section 2
of the bill itself, rather than as part of the amendment to section 2 of the
Clayton Act which is provided for in section 1 to the present bill.
. . . .
Subsection (h) of the Senate amendment . . . appears in the conference
report as section 3 of the bill itself. It contains the operative and penal provisions
of what was originally the Borah-Van Nuys bill (S. 4171). While they overlap
in some respects, they are in no way inconsistent with the provisions of the
Clayton Act amendment provided for in Section 1, Section 3 authorizes nothing
which that amendment prohibits, and takes nothing from it. On the contrary,
where only civil remedies and liabilities attach to violations of the amendment
provided in section 1, section 3 sets up special prohibitions as to the particular
2
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Whether or not the majority opinion is correct,' it appears that'
Nashville Milk vitiated the unreasonably low prices provision of section
3 as far as the private plaintiff is concerned. It should be noted, first,
that the Court's denial of recovery for damages imposed upon the
plaintiff by the illegal acts of the defendant stands in sharp contrast
to the growing trend in public policy to expand recovery rights of
persons injured by violations of statutes intended to provide protection
from economic wrongdoing. 8 The decision specifically prohibits a plain-
tiff, allegedly injured by sales at unreasonably low prices, from bringing
a private suit against an alleged violator of section 3. Therefore, since
the section must be treated solely as a criminal statute, enforcement
is entrusted to the Department of Justice; ° and it should be noted that
during the quarter-century existence of the Robinson-Patman Act prior
to Nashville Milk, the number of suits instituted by private plaintiffs
greatly exceeded those brought by the Department.I° To say that the
Department had been less than enthusiastic about enforcing section 3
prior to the Nashville Milk decision would not be an inaccurate state-
ment.'
Since Nashville Milk, then, the balance of power has appeared to
be weighted in the favor of the predator. The decision has been re-
sponsible in part for several attempts to enact legislation which would
adjust that balancel 2 by making the practice of selling at unreasonably
offenses therein described and attaches to them also the criminal penalties therein
provided.
H.R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936) (emphasis added).
7 Justice Douglas, dissenting, was not moved by the majority's logic and was of the
opposite opinion as to Congress' intentions regarding § 3 and private actions. He was not
convinced that suits for treble damages should be allowed only for price discrimination
suits brought under § 2 of the Clayton Act and not for those brought under § 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act. His conclusion was that "there is no suggestion that any such line
was being drawn by the Congress. The emphasis on the restrictive effect of § 3 relates
simply to its criminal sanctions, not to the remedial provisions with which we are
presently concerned." 355 U.S. at 384.
Nashville Milk was only the culmination of , a number of cases concerning this ques-
tion. As early as 1942, a contrary conclusion had been reached by a district court that
held that § 3 was part of the antitrust laws, and that a private civil action could be
brought for an alleged violation of the section. Atlantic Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 44 F. Supp.
39 (ED. Tex. 1942). See also Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951);
Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950); and Balian Ice Cream Co.
v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Stipp. 796 (S.D. Cal, 1950).
8 See, e.g., § 130 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970),
allowing civil suits by private individuals allegedly injured by violations of that Act's
disclosure provisions.
9 See F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patin= Act 468 (1962).
10 Id. at 468-70.
11 "Section 3 has seldom if ever been utilized by the Government . . . ." C. Austin,
Price Discrimination and Related, Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act 4 (1953).
See also F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 469 (1962).
12 See, e.g., S. 1494, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The hearings on S. 1494 were
opened by Senator Hart with this statement:
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low prices or selling below cost," for the purposes of destroying com-
petition or eliminating a competitor, the basis of a private cause of
action. The most recent such attempt is S. 1457," a bill introduced by
Senator Sparkman in April 1971. The bill was aimed at eliminating
the evils inherent in below-cost selling and the use of "loss leaders""
by incorporating as part of the anti-trust laws the statutes proscribing
these predatory pricing activities, in order to give to those injured by
such practices an opportunity to file suit in federal courts in their own
behalf, without awaiting relief through governmental action.
Another judicial decision, United States v. National Dairy Prod-
ucts Corp.," has also focused attention on Section 3 of the Robinson-
Patman Act. In National Dairy, the constitutionality of that section's
provision of penal sanctions for the practice of selling goods at "un-
reasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or
eliminating a competitor" was challenged. The defendant argued that
the section was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite as applied to
sales made below cost. The Supreme Court upheld the statute, reason-
ing that since section 3 had given the defendants adequate notice that
sales below cost with the intent to destroy competition were unlawful,
they were well aware that their conduct was proscribed. Given this
awareness, the Court concluded, the defendants could not be heard to
The present proposal would make section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act part
of the antitrust laws by repealing that section and reenacting it as section 3A of
the Clayton Act. It eliminates altogether the first two provisions of the present
section 3—which have been continuously labeled as redundant—and also would
eliminate the present criminal sanctions.
However, the bill would enable private parties suffering damages by reason
of violations of the third provision of section 3 [sales at unreasonably low
prices] to bring treble damage actions against the violator and would authorize
the United States to bring injunctive proceedings to restrain violations of the
new section 3A.
Hearings on S. 1494 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1970).
13 "Cost" has been defined as "fully distributed cost, which includes the cost of
producing or acquiring or processing the product, plus the additional allocated delivery,
selling and administrative costs involved in doing business." S. 1457, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3A (1971). In this context, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372
U.S. 29, petition for rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 961 (1963) ; National Dairy Products
Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965), vacated and remanded, 384 U.S. 883
(1966), reversed and remanded on procedural grounds, 384 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 957 (1968).
14 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
15 "Loss leading" is a retailing practice whereby a particular item, usually a popular
one, is sold at a loss in order to build up store traffic. In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma
Retail Grocers Ass'n, Inc., 360 U.S. 334 (1959), the Court observed that "[t]he selling
of selected goods at a loss in order to lure customers into the store is deemed not only
a destructive means of competition; it also plays on the gullibility of customers by leading
them to expect what generally is not true, namely, that a store which offered such an
amazing bargain is full of other such bargains." Id. at 340.
18 372 U.S. 29, petition for rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 961 (1963).
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complain that section 3 was "void foi vagueness."'T National Dairy,
then, is significant in that the Court left no doubts as to the propriety
of utilizing Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act to proscribe preda-
tory pricing practices such as sales at unreasonably low prices or sales
below cost. Any doubts raised by Nashville Milk as to the legal effect
of section 3 were largely dispelled by National Dairy.
The issues raised in Nashville Milk and National Dairy, however,
are only one facet of a widespread debate. Inasmuch as legislation
proscribing sales at unreasonably low prices has attracted numerous
critics and detractors, it is necessary to discuss and evaluate the two
main criticisms directed at the legislation—first, that it is not necessary
because the alleged practices do not exist; and secondly, that in light
of the existence of other legislation dealing with predatory pricing
practices, laws concerned with sales at unreasonably low prices are
redundant.' In order to understand either argument, the context in
which they arise—a context in which the very existence of predatory
pricing is questioned—must first be examined.
I. THE NECESSITY OF PROHIBITIONS AGAINST SALES AT
UNREASONABLY Low PRICES
The question recurs whether such practices as price discrimination
or sales below cost in fact exist, and, if they do exist, whether they
have the requisite anticompetitive impact to justify governmental inter-
ference. There has long been opposition to the public policy expressed
by laws incorporating the "conduct" approach to anticompetitive be-
havior, that is, to laws such as those proscribing predatory pricing
practices. Some critics have steadfastly denied even the existence of
such trade practices as sales at unreasonably low prices or predatory
price discrimination. Others have taken the position that although
practices injurious to competition might exist, their harmful results
are relatively insignificant and could be eliminated by altering the
structure of the affected industry."
11 372 U.S. at 37. As National Dairy indicates, one of the chief objections to
previous efforts to enact sales below cost legislation in general, and to § 3 specifically,
is that the phrase "unreasonably low prices" is vague. With respect to sales below cost,
Senator Sparkman's bill overcomes this objection by explicitly defining the concept in
the language of National Dairy. S. 1457, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3A (1971).
18 Objection has also been made to the criminal provision of § 3 of the Robinson-
Patman Act on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague. However, as National Dairy
indicates, the United States Supreme Court has dismissed these objections. In any case,
our concern lies with the civil aspects of the provision in § 3 regarding sales at un-
reasonably low prices.
19 For a discussion of market "structure" and market "conduct," see R. Caves,
American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance (1964). The principal elements
of market structure are concentration, product differentiation and barriers to the entry
of new firms. Id. at 16. Market conduct consists of three major areas: policies regarding
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Two relatively recent additions to an increasing number of state-
ments denying a, need for further legislation prohibiting price dis-
crimination are the Nea1 2° and the Stigler21 reports. Both reports
conclude that there is no need today for many of the present price
discrimination statutes including, presumably, those statutes concern-
ing sales at unreasonably low prices and sales below cost. 22 This con-
clusion, the Stigler Report argues, is supported by the fact that " [t]here
is now an impressive body of literature arguing the improbability that
a profit-maximizing seller, even one with monopoly power, would or
could use below-cost selling to monopolize additional market.""
Further, both reports are opposed to any great degree of Robinson-
Patman Act enforcement.24 It is significant to note, however, that both
reports, as well as the many studies critical of the Robinson-Patman
Act and its enforcement, are generally devoid of any empirical data
in support of the conclusions reached."
setting prices, policies regarding setting the quality of the product, and policies aimed
at coercing rivals. Id. at 37.
20 White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, BNA Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep., No. 411, May 21, 1969, Pt. II [hereinafter cited as Neal Report].
21 President's Task Force Report on Productivity and Competition, 5 CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. Ii 50,108, at 55,129 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Stigler Report].
22 The Neal Report, for example, argued that
[nalany of the reasons for price discrimination are related to the improved
functioning of the competitive system. Price discrimination has an adverse ef-
fect on competition only in exceptional cases. Therefore, a statute restricting
price discrimination should be narrowly drawn, to avoid losing the important
benefits of price discrimination in an excessive effort to curb limited harm.
Neal Report, supra note 20, at 10. The Stigler Report concludes that "a prohibition
against price discrimination may preclude the kind of competition that is most likely to
lead to lower prices in oligopolistic industries." Stigler Report, supra note 21, at 55,137.
23 Stigler Report, supra note 21, at 55,132. It should be noted that the Stigler
Report assumes that it is possible to predict accurately the working of "the forces of
competition." Any prediction of how a profit-maximizing seller will behave must rest on
the assumption that the seller has almost perfect knowledge of the relevant factors con-
cerning his market and that he acts on the basis of this knowledge. Obviously, such per-
fect knowledge is not generally available, and decisions are invariably based on imperfect
knowledge. More important, whether the profit-maximizing seller will act logically and
rationally depends on a variety of circumstances. Therefore it is not at all clear whether
the actions of a profit-maximizing seller can be as readily predicted as the Report suggests.
24 The Neal Report states that the Robinson-Patman Act "tended to focus attention
of courts and enforcement agencies upon the plight of individual competitors rather than
the state of competition in the line of commerce affected. Efforts to preserve individual
competitors sometimes seriously restricted the forces of competition." Neal Report, supra
note 20, at 19. The Stigler Report viewed the "Federal Trade Commission's tendency in
recent times to relax the enforcement of the [Robinson-Patman] Act as desirable, but so
long as private treble damage actions are available, an inadequate reform." Stigler Report,
supra note 21, at 55,137.
25 See Posner, Dissenting View: Do We Really Need an FTC? 3 Antitrust Law
& Econ. Rev. 65 (Spring 1970). Other commentators, referring to criticism of the anti-
trust laws in general—criticism analogous to that made of the Robinson-Patman Act—
observed that "[Me amazing thing about the vociferous new criticism of the antitrust
laws is the paucity of evidence it has offered to show that antitrust decisions have actually
6
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Rather, the experiences of the Federal Trade Commission, Con-
gress and the courts dictate a conclusion which conflicts with that of
the Stigler and Neal reports." Indeed, there exists an "impressive
body of literature" supporting the proposition that sales at unreasonably
low prices have been, and continue to be, a serious problem for the
businessman.27 judging from the number of complaints which the Com-
mission receives alleging sales at unreasonably low prices, the problem
would appear to be far from non-existent." Some complaints included
charges that predatory pricing practices bad such disastrous effects
on small business firms that many were not expected to survive. Wit-
nesses testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee said that this result has already occurred in the dairy industry,
which has witnessed the disappearance of thousands of independent
firms." The testimony adduced at these hearings included allegations
that predatory price discrimination practices in the form of unreason-
ably low prices had accounted for the disappearance of many of the
independent firms."
The dairy industry is not the only vivid example of the impact of
had or even threatened to have the awful economic consequences that they predict so
freely." J. Dirlam & A. Kahn, Fair Competition, The Law and Economics of Antitrust
Policy 260 (1954).
28 The conclusion of those reports has been "refuted by hundreds of cases brought
by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. . . ." Hearings on
Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act Before the Special Subcomm. on Small
Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the House Select Comm. on Small Business,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 196 (1969).
27 Professor Robert C. Brooks, Jr., has compiled a list of such a "body of literature,"
which appears in the Hearings on S. 1494 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1969 Price Discrimination Hearings]. His compilation includes the following sources:
J. Bain, Industrial Organization 422-23 (2d ed. 1968) ; J. Dirlam & A. Kahn, Fair Competi-
tion, The Law and Economics of Antitrust Polley 212-216, 234 (1954); Brooks, Injury
to Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 777 (1961); Stocking,
The Attorney General's Committee's Report: The Businessman's Guide Through Anti-
trust, 44 Geo. L.J. 1 (1955). As to the potential impact of price discrimination in general,
see W. Shepherd, Market Power & Economic Welfare (1970), where the author concludes
that
IBM appears to have gained and held its market share mainly via substantial and
pervasive price discrimination of several sorts. This is possible because IBM
probably has large amounts of overhead or floating costs in its development and
sales support activities. Accordingly, IBM is inherently able and induced by
rational profit-maximizing to engage in systematic price discrimination on a
larger scale.
Id. at 227.
28 See Statement by A. Everette Maclntyre Before the Master Photo Dealers' and
Finishers' Ass'n, A Look at Unfair Methods of Competition, Chicago, April 21, 1971.
20 See 1969 Price Discrimination Hearings, supra note 27, at 107-08.
8° Id. at 107-08, 115, 120. See also Hearings on Small Business Problems in the
Dairy Industry Before a Special Subcomm. of the House Select Subcomm. on Small
Business, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. V, at 769 (1959). For testimony relating to the petroleum
industry, see 1969 Price Discrimination Hearings, supra note 27, at 162-63, 165.
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predatory pricing behavior. In 1967, a highly profitable twenty-seven
store food chain from New Jersey, specializing in private brands and
discount prices, planned to open a dozen or more stores in the Wash-
ington, D.C. area. Its price structure was about four percent below the
price level prevailing in the Washington area market. When the chain
opened three stores, the three major chains already operating in the area
met the new competition by offering allegedly below-cost prices in the
stores that they operated in the immediate vicinity of the new entrant's
stores. The New Jersey chain was forced to withdraw.' Subsequently,
in 1970, a California-based discount food chain opened two large
discount centers in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs of Washington.
The pricing practices of the centers caused a marketing shift to general
discounting by area food stores, resulting in a consumer benefit of
approximately $40 million a year. The California food chain, unlike
its New Jersey counterpart, was not met with below-cost pricing by
the three major chains. Perhaps an FTC investigation prompted by the
1967 episode had had a prophylactic effect."
Congressional experience similarly indicates the continued exis-
tence of predatory pricing practices. When Senator Hart commenced
price discrimination hearings in 1969 he observed:
Another popular myth among some of the antitrust
academicians is that predatory pricing does not exist. I am
not sure what sort of empirical data they have gathered to
prove this point, but I suggest they go out into the marketplace
and talk to some independent businessmen. These men know
that they are being destroyed, not by inefficiency nor by
honest competition in all cases, but by unfair predatory acts.
Then I would suggest these same experts read the detailed
testimony of these businessmen who have talked to this Con-
gress giving chapter and verse for the past 10 years."
During the course of the hearings that followed, considerable evidence
was introduced to support Senator Hart's observations." A representa-
tive incident was related by one witness concerning a two-hundred
outlet discount supermarket chain that used milk as a continuing loss
leader in a particular market." The chain purchased milk for thirty-
nine cents per half gallon and sold it at the same price instead of the
31 Hearings on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act Before the Special
Subcomm. on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the House Select Comm.
on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 725 (1970).
82 For the particulars of this investigation, see Staff Report to the Federal Trade
Commission, Discount Food Pricing in Washington, D.C. (1971).
88 1969 Price Discrimination Hearings, supra note 27, at 2.
84 Id. at 102-20.
88 Id. at 107.
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normal retail price, which would include a markup of ten cents. Present
judicial opinions categorize this practice as a "sale below cost."" The
end result of such a practice must be an adverse effect on competition
due to the weakening or elimination of competitors. In this case, for
example, one immediate result of sales below cost was the demise of
home delivery by local dairy processors, with a corresponding loss of
sales by those processors." Admittedly, home delivery may not be the
most efficient method of getting milk into the hands of the consumer
at the lowest possible price. Many consumers, however, prefer this
method of distribution to retail store purchases, and it appears likely
that in this case home delivery would have survived absent predatory
pricing.
Another excellent illustration of predatory pricing behavior in-
130 The outer boundaries of what constitutes a sale below cost have been established
in National Dairy Products Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965), where
the court held that sales need not be below direct cost to be sales below cost; rather, they
can be classified as sales below cost if they are made somewhere below fully distributed
cost, which includes the cost of production plus the delivery, selling and administrative
costs. Id. at 330. Earlier, the Supreme . Court 'L held in United States v. National Dairy
Products Corp. that "[w]tiether 'below cost' refers to 'direct' or 'fully distributed' cost
or some other level of cost computation cannot be decided in abstract." 372 U.S. 24, 34
(1963). In other words, the seller's intent is considered as at least as important as
theoretical cost considerations. As the court observed in Ben Hur Coal Co. v. WeIls,
242 F.2d 481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957): "In the final analysis, the
question resolves itself into one of intent and purpose, not a choice of accounting
methods." Id. at 486. See also F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman
Act 466 (1962). There are,, of course, instances in which the requisite predatory intent is
Iacldng and where sales below cost are perfectly justified, as when they are made for a
legitimate commercial objective such as liquidation of excess, obsolete or perishable
merchandise. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 37 (1963).
" 1969 Price Discrimination Hearings, supra note 27, at 107. The use of loss
leaders and its possible adverse effect on competition has been described by the National
Commission on Food Marketing as follows:
While price specials constitute price competition for the few people who shop by
items, most shoppers buy a group of items. The supermarket is spending con-
siderable time and ingenuity in pricing its mix of merchandise to appear com-
petitive and remain profitable. For this reason, the advertised specials do not
give the housewife many clues concerning alternate offerings for her shopping
list. Since she cannot determine at which store the price (for her list) is lower,
it is hard to say the price is the primary focus of competition. The price special
and the supermarket e f orts at pricing the mix are not examples of authentic
price competition, and they do not assure the kind of performance that price
competition is expected to encourage. Price specialing by supermarkets, however,
may result in competitive injury to retail operations specialized in a few lines.
Retail home delivery of dairy products is an example. Consumers may value the
convenience of home delivery enough to pay the difference between store costs
and delivery costs. If fluid milk were specialed so intensely that the super-
market's selling price fell below cost, dairy delivery operation might be hurt
significantly.
National Comm'n on Food Marketing, Organization and Competition in Food Retailing
176-77 (1966) (emphasis added). See also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers
Ass'n, Inc., 360 U.S. 344 (1959).
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volving sales below cost is National Dairy Products Corp. v. FTC."
The Kraft Foods Division of National Dairy, the largest producer of
fruit spreads in the United States and the only nationwide seller of a
full line of different flavored spreads, was not satisfied with its sales
volume in the Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Richmond and Norfolk
market areas.89 To expand its share of the market in these areas,
Kraft embarked upon a one-for-one promotion—for each case bought
during January 16, 1961, and February 10, 1961, one case would be
delivered free. The response was overwhelming and, since there was
no restriction on quantities, retailers bought to the limit of their
financial abilities.° Thus, while in 1960 Kraft had sold 168,977 cases
in these four trade areas, during the 1961 twenty-six day promotion
period 400,803 Cases were sold 4 1 Both the FTC° and, on appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, found that the
program constituted sales below cost and violated Section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act.°
Of greater significance, for the purpose of this discussion, was the
court's finding that Kraft's sales below cost resulted in "great and
damaging" injury to competition." During the promotion, the court
38 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969). The case was brought by the FTC under § 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act as a geographic price discrimination case.
89
 In 1960, Kraft had an annual sales volume of $475,129 in the four market areas,
a total comparable to the combined sales volume of its leading independent regional com-
petitors. Kraft had achieved this sales volume in only four years, notwithstanding the
fact that its prices were higher than those of its leading independent competitor. Id. at
609 n.2.
49 To finance even larger purchases, retailers converted the product to cash by
selling the spreads at half price to the consumer. This development caused Kraft to
cancel plans for its own retail promotional activities which had been scheduled in addi-
tion to the one-for-one promotion in order to move the spreads. Id. at 609.
41
 Of the 400,803 cases to be delivered free, only 153,909 were actually delivered; for
the balance of 246,894 Kraft reimbursed the retailer in cash amounting to $829,005. Id. at
609 n.2. •
-42 National Diary Products Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Trade Reg.
Rep. If 18,027, at 20,412 (FTC 1967).
43 412 F.2d at 610-11. The court concluded that while intent need not be a pre-
requisite for a violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, such design could be
inferred from the fact situation in National Dairy. Id. at 618-19.
44
 Id. at 610, 617. The court noted that
[c]ompetition was lessened drastically for at least six months or more and there-
after to a certain extent was lessened for some time. The program not only
diverted sales of competitors but made it impossible to compete with petitioner
for the market. This is so because of the nature of the program as to below cost
pricing, unlimited as to quantity of purchasing, and other attendant factors in
the program of six months duration. Nothing prevented the trade from purchasing
one month to a year or more supply of fruit spreads although a feeble and in-
effective effort was made by petitioner during the 26 day period to screen orders.
Strong existing competition was rendered helpless to compete with below cost
pricing as the competitors were not the financial equal of the petitioner. Aside
from the actual substantial lessening of competition for such a substantial period
of time there was the reasonable probability based upon substantial facts that
10
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found, supermarkets reduced the shelf space of many Kraft competitors
in order to move Kraft's spreads. This preference was continued after
the promotion, thereby creating a lasting effect and causing Kraft's
three principal independent competitors to suffer substantial declines
in sales."
No conclusion can be drawn from cases such as National Dairy
but that predatory pricing practices do exist. As National Dairy indi-
cates, competitive injury need not necessarily be the result of superior
performance; it may also arise from the practice of selling at un-
reasonably low prices. The examples given above, then, strongly sug-
gest a need for legislation enabling anyone who is injured by such
practices to seek redress in his own behalf. More significantly, they
demonstrate both the continued existence of predatory pricing and
the continuing need for enforcement of the laws against such practices.
It should be clear that those instances of predatory pricing which
are detected should be viewed as the top of an iceberg, with potential
for considerable damage lying beneath the surface. That potential
could well be realized if existing predatory pricing proscriptions were
to be weakened or repealed altogether. Further, the existence of the
legislation reduces the visibility of predatory pricing practices. Those
who wish to engage in such practices successfully must do so without
being detected. Hence a predator may consider elimination of a com-
petitor too risky and may prefer only to soften the competition, that is,
to use predatory pricing to prevent members of the particular industry
from competing vigorously and aggressively. The predator could main-
tain a price structure most favorable to him under the threat of in-
creased predation, and his competitors in the industry, eager to remain
in business, might accept such an arrangement, and so make detection
virtually impossible. Moreover, the weakened victim may be eventually
acquired by the predator, leaving no one to complain. It appears, then,
the duration of such damage to competitors would be even greater. The timely
interference of the Federal Trade Commission investigation of petitioner's pro-
gram brought about a drastic change in the program five weeks later which
prevented greater destruction of a substantial segment of competition in the areas.
Id. at 618.
45
 Id. at 617. For other cases involving predatory pricing see: Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47
(1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); United States v. National Dairy
Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A, Fry Roofing
Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Nashville Milk Co.
v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958); Safeway Stares, Inc. v. Vance, 355 U.S. 389
(1958); and Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). See also FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), and Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d
712 (7th Cir. 1968). For a detailed analysis of the Anheuser-Busch case, see 1969 Price
Discrimination Hearings, supra note 27, at 144, and Maclntyre, The Federal Trade
Commission's Antitrust Functions: Some PrEictical Problems in Enforcement, 14 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 997 (1967).
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that to conclude that the dangers of predatory pricing practices are
de minimis because they may not be highly visible is a grave mistake.
The evils attendant upon predatory pricing practices extend beyond
the immediate injury to competition caused by the utilization of sales
at unreasonably low prices and price discrimination to force competitors
out of business. It has long been concluded that such practices also
foster economic concentration. 46
 The proposals noted above that would
limit existing laws against price discrimination have not dealt with this
problem. None of them contemplates restructuring industries which
have become concentrated through means other than mergers—that is,
through predatory pricing practices. 47
 Were these suggestions to be
followed, then, no protection at all would be afforded against concentra-
tion caused by price discrimination. It would seem, therefore, that until
legislation is passed permitting the restructuring of an industry con-
centrated through predatory pricing, the existing laws dealing with the
causes of such concentration ought not only to be retained, but expanded
in scope and enforced more diligently than they are at present.
II. WOULD INCORPORATION OF SECTION 3 WITHIN THE ANTITRUST
LAWS BE REDUNDANT?
Nashville Milk revealed that the private party who considers
himself injured by practices forbidden by Section 3 of the Robinson-
Patman Act can do little to redress his injury. Despite the inadequacy
of governmental action, the private plaintiff cannot bring a private
action under section 3 specifically alleging sales at unreasonably low
prices. Yet many critics of predatory pricing legislation believe that
legislation incorporating section 3 within the antitrust laws, and so
enabling private plaintiffs to sue for treble damages, would be re-
dundant." These critics argue that predatory pricing practices, includ-
40 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also W. Shepherd,
Market Power and Economic Welfare (1970).
47
 It should be noted that the Neal Report does make certain recommendations
aimed at the reduction of industrial concentration. Neal Report, supra note 20, at 12
-13.
Legislative action thereon, however, is doubtful. See, however, J. Dirlam & A. Kahn,
Fair Competition, The Law and Economics of Antitrust Policy (1954), where it is pointed
out:
The antitrust laws cannot be turned into a statute for the structuring of all
markets in the direction of power competition. Apart from the economic objec-
tions to such a program, it would be politically impossible. It is questionable if
it is worth devoting the bureaucratic resources necessary to achieve a reordered
structure, and it is questionable too whether the resultant discord and confusion
might not impair economic performance more than the final restructuring would
improve it.
Id. at 284.
48
 During the course of the 1969 Price Discrimination Hearings on S. 1494, John
Bodner, on behalf of the American Bar Association, argued that
[s]uch redundancy is totally unnecessary, for it is clear that existing laws
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ing sales at unreasonably low prices, are already proscribed by Section
2 of the Sherman Act and Section 2 of the Clayton Act," and accord-
ingly the private remedies provided by those statutes are available as
sanctions against such practices.
The merits of this argument ought to be examined. The conclusion
that Section 2 of the Sherman Act invariably applies to practices
covered by Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act might be sustained
in the abstract, if predatory pricing practices always constituted at-
tempts to monopolize. In reality, however, such attempts are not
necessarily involved, as the case of Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co.'"
illustrates. Kroger was a retail grocery chain, operating about 1,500
retail grocery stores in some thirty states, that had used dairy products
provide a complete remedy against all nefarious pricing practices which the pro-
ponents of the bill [S. 1494] would prohibit. Predatory pricing and sales below
cost without justifying reason violate the Sherman Act. Section 2 of the Sherman
Act prohibits the use of predatory pricing practices to aid integration of two
corporate units, to create a monopoly, to attempt to monopolize, or to destroy
competition, and provides criminal, civil, and treble damage remedies. Moreover,
Section 2 liability for predatory practices does not presuppose giant corporations
or monopolists, but can also reach the predatory activities by smaller firms.
Predatory discriminatory pricing practices which are potentially injurious
to competition are prohibited by Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act, unless based upon cost justification or the seller's
good faith meeting of a competitor's price. This provision is fully enforceable
by civil proceedings, administrative proceedings, and private treble damage suits.
1969 Price Discrimination Hearings, supra note 27, at 100.
A similar position was expressed in the Report of the Attorney General's Nat'l Comm.
to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955): "The prohibition in Section 3 of predatory pricing
is legally redundant. Predatory price slashing obviously constitutes an attempt to
monopolize, already rendered a crime by Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and an unfair
method of competition under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." Id. at 201.
The Stigler Report concluded that
[wle can conceive of no case of discrimination in which the Sherman Act would
not provide an adequate remedy—adequate that is, to protect the interest in
maintaining an effectively competitive economy—and so we view Robinson-
Patman enforcement as inherently likely to be pushed beyond proper limits.
Stigler Report, supra note 21, at 55,132. Further, Assistant Attorney General Richard W.
McLaren has stated that
[p]ending . . . a review of the entire subject of price discrimination, we see no
compelling necessity for incorporating into the antitrust laws the prohibition
against predatorily unreasonably low prices. In appropriate cases, section 2 of
the Clayton Act and/or section 2 of the Sherman Act are available to both
private litigants and Government for civil relief against such trade practices.
1969 Price Discrimination Hearings, supra note 27, at 129-30. Sec also Comment, Sales
Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing under State Law, 57 Yale L.J. 391, 400
(1948).
40
 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). It must be noted that "sales below cost . . . with the
purpose, intent, or effect of injuring a competitor or destroying competition" are
proscribed by statute in 30 states and are grounds for private injunction sults in 27
states. 2 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1111 6621-29 (1971).
so 274 F. Supp. 966 (ED. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
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as "loss leaders," allegedly with the specific intent to monopolize trade
in fluid milk and dairy products. Then, in February 1967, Kroger
commenced construction of a dairy processing plant with the capacity
to supply more than twenty percent of the total consumer demand for
fluid milk and other dairy products in the St. Louis, Missouri area."
At that time, Kroger was selling approximately eight percent of the
fluid milk and dairy products in that market, and the new plant would
have given it the capacity to sell an additional twelve percent. The com-
plaint alleged that the prospective additional capacity to be provided
by the plant under construction would permit Kroger to use loss leaders
more effectively, facilitating the establishment of monopoly power in
the dairy product market. The plaintiff sought an injunction against
completion of the plant on the ground that it constituted an attempt to
monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The district court concluded that "the mere construction of the
processing plant by Kroger will not constitute a violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Antitrust Act." 52 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit unanimously agreed:
An unlawful attempt to monopolize presupposes a "dangerous
probability" of monopolization if the attempt is successful
. . . . Twenty percent alone of a market would be insufficient
to achieve a monopoly. While size is an earmark of monopoly
power ... , a substantial part of the market must be controlled
by the monopolist to enable the raising and lowering of prices
and the undue restriction on competition."
Moreover, the court concluded that inasmuch as all previous judicial
decisions considering the question had found violations of Section 2
of the Sherman Act only when the defendants had market shares of at
least seventy percent," Kroger's employment of "loss leaders" could
51 For the purpose of the case, the geographic market was defined as the geographical
area within 250 miles of St. Louis, Missouri. 402 F.2d at 970.
52 274 F. Supp. at 969.
68 402 F.2d at 974.
54 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911). In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945),
Judge Learned Hand stated that while the defendant's ninety percent share of the market
was a monopoly, "it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and
certainly thirty-three percent is not." Id. at 424. In United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), the Court held that a fifty percent market share did not
constitute a monopoly. The lowest market share found to constitute a monopoly was
seventy percent. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Former
Assistant Attorney General Turner, testifying before a congressional committee, stated
that "Section 2 [of the Sherman Act] refers to monopolies but not to oligopolies, and
it has never been found to cover a monopoly in an industry in which the leading firm
accounts for less than 70 percent of the market." Hearings on the Status and Future of
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not be questioned under section 2 because Kroger did not possess the
requisite percentage of market share. Further, the absence of the
customary elements of monopoly, i.e., the power arbitrarily to raise
prices and to eliminate competitors, convinced the court that no viola-
tion of section 2 existed."
Although under existing precedent the decision was not incorrect,
it indicates that the courts will not use Section 2 of the Sherman Act
as a means of preventing all acts of predatory pricing. If a plaintiff
must prove either a "dangerous probability" of monopolization or the
existence of a monopoly, then section 2 cannot be used to deter preda-
tory pricing practices of an alleged violator who has less than a seventy
percent market share." As Hiland demonstrates, competition and com-
petitors can be injured by predatory pricing practices which the Sher-
man Act would not proscribe and, however credible may be the theory
that Section 2 of the Sherman Act generally applies to predatory
pricing, it is true only in those instances where the plaintiff can show
that the challenged practice would lead to monopolization or create a
dangerous probability thereof. Further, the argument that incorporating
predatory pricing legislation within the antitrust laws is unnecessary
in light of the scope of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is not more than
a refinement of the argument that any predatory pricing legislation
is unnecessary, an argument shown to be fallacious by the examples
of mischief given above. Finally, if section 2 adequately covers preda-
tory pricing practices, as some allege, why was it deemed necessary by
Congress in 1936 to enact further legislation proscribing these prac-
tices?"
The second argument advanced in support of the contention that
Small Business Before the Select Senate Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
714 (1967).
55 402 F.2d at 974.
56 The Department of Justice, in its brief as amicus curiae on Inland's petition for
certiorari, concluded that an
falttempt to monopolize ... is not limited to acts which, while falling short of
monopolization, create a dangerous probability that it will be attained . . . .
It also reaches acts by one competitor that exclude another from the market,
when the acts in themselves are so predatory, unfair, or clearly without
legitimate business purpose as to be patently unreasonable restraints.
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Hiland Dairy, Inc. v.
Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968). Notwithstanding this conclusion, however, the
Department insisted that § 2 of the Sherman Act is sufficient to deal with predatory
pricing practices such as "loss leadets." Id. at 12.
57 Between 1914 and 1936, four price discrimination suits brought under § 2 of the
Clayton Act reached the courts. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939); Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 F.
733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 733 (1924), National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 F.
733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924); Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 F. 774 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923). In each case, the Clayton Act was found not
to have been violated.
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providing private-action sanctions for predatory pricing legislation
would be redundant rests on the assumption that all predatory prac-
tices are covered by Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, the provision
dealing with price discrimination. Section 2 (a) makes it "unlawful
... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality,"" unless such practices are necessary to "make
. . . due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery . ."" or such discrimination was made "in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor . . . .""' The argument would rely,
then, on section 2 (a)'s prohibition of price discrimination; and in so
relying it ignores the fact that the practice of predatory pricing, such
as selling at unreasonably low prices, need not involve concomitant
price discrimination. in National Dairy Products Corp. v. FTC,81 for
example, the Commission, alleging territorial price discrimination,
relied successfully on Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act. Its reliance
would have been in vain, however, had National Dairy made the
one-for-one offer on a nationwide basis; there would then have been
no discrimination which would have fallen within the proscription of
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, because no competitor would have been
discriminated against.
III. STRUCTURAL REMEDIES
Other critics of predatory pricing legislation, conceding the exis-
tence of predatory pricing practices and their injurious effects upon
competition, have argued that the agents of antitrust enforcement
should be concerned only with the result of such practices and not
with the manner in which that result is achieved. These critics would
ignore the price discrimination laws and would use instead legislation
focused upon the structure of markets to eliminate predatory pricing
practices and their injurious effects on competition. Those taking this
position argue that if it can be shown that competition has been elimi-
nated or curtailed as a result of the structure of a particular industry,
the industry should be restructured. The Neal Report takes this ap-
proach in recommending enactment of legislation which, upon a finding
58 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
69 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
go 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970).
61 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969). Proponents of the position which states that
"[p]redatory discriminatory pricing practices which are potentially injurious to competi-
tion are prohibited by Section 2 of the Clayton Act" explicitly limited the scope of § 2
to those practices which are "discriminatory." 1969 Price Discrimination Hearings, supra
note 27, at 100. Therefore, cases employed by those holding this view, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), and United States v. Borden Co., 370
U.S. 460 (1962), cannot be applied to practices involving only sales at "unreasonably low
prices," inasmuch as those cases dealt with "discriminatory pricing" on the local level.
16
PREDATORY PRICING LEGISLATION
of oligopoly, would limit to twelve percent the market share of the firms
comprising the oligopoly."
At present, however, this approach would offer little protection
from predatory pricing. Thus far, structural analysis has been applied
with a degree of consistency only in the merger area." This would
mean, under present judicial standards, that structural tests would be
useless against price predators who had gained their market position
through means other than mergers, unless, of course, the predator
achieved significant monopolization or the threat thereof. Not since
the Standard Oil" and American Tobacco" cases of 1911 have there
been any successful" efforts to apply the antitrust laws to a concen-
02 Neal Report, supra note 20, at 12-13. The proposed law would provide:
Section 1. Reduction of Industrial Concentration
(a) It shall be the duty of the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Com-
mission to investigate the structure of markets which appear to be oligopoly
industries.
(b) When, as a result of such investigation, the Attorney General determines
that a market appears to be an oligopoly industry and that effective relief
is likely to be available under this Act, he shall institute a proceeding in equity
for the reduction of concentration, to which all firms which appear to be oligopoly
firms in such oligopoly industry shall be made parties.
(e) The court shall enter a Judgment determining whether one or more markets
are oligopoly industries and, if so, which of the parties are oligopoly firms in
such oligopoly industries, Any party to the proceeding may appeal such Judgment
directly to the Supreme Court.
(d) In order to provide an opportunity for voluntary steps looking toward
reduction of concentration, no affirmative relief shall be ordered against such
oligopoly firms for a period of one year following entry or affirmance of such
Judgment.
(e) After such one-year period, further proceedings shall be conducted and a
decree entered providing such further relief as may be appropriate, in light of
steps taken or initiated during the one-year period, to achieve, within a reasonable
period of time not in excess of four years, a reduction of concentration such that
the market share of each oligopoly firm in such oligopoly industry does not
exceed 12%.
In C. Kaysen & D. Turner's Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis
(1959), oligopoly is classified as "loose" or "tight." A Loose oligopoly is one in which a
"very small number (eight or fewer) firms . . [supply] 50 percent of the market,
with the largest firm having a 20 percent or higher share .. . ." Id. at 72. A tight
oligopoly is one in which "a single large firm supplying 60 percent or more of the market,
with no other single seller supplying a significant proportion of the demand . ," Id.
See also Kennecott Copper Corp., 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 11 19,619, at 21,666 (FTC
1971) .
08 See, for example, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
See also Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 226 (1960) ; Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313 (1965).
64 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
65 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
60 Successful in the sense of transforming a monopoly into an oligopoly. Unsuccess-
ful attempts were, for example, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920),
and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Alcoa
case must be considered unsuccessful in this context since the final decree did not
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trated industry, or to one that is on the way to becoming concentrated,
when such concentration was not the result of merger or acquisition.'
It is evident, therefore, that reliance on a structural test, to the exclu-
sion of any prohibitions on predatory behavior, would leave unpro-
tected those businesses which operate in non-monopolistic markets.
IV. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND PREDATORY PRICING—
A SUGGESTION FOR STANDARDS"
Considerable confusion has been introduced in antitrust case law
and literature by such pronouncements as "diversion of business cannot
be equated with injury" and "antitrust is concerned with competition
and not competitors."" An uncritical acceptance and application of
these slogans not only would conflict with the spirit of predatory pricing
legislation, but would prove the slogans false as well. It cannot be
overemphasized that predatory pricing can create a significant degree
of business diversion sufficient to hinder effective competitor perfor-
provide for dissolution. Competition in the industry was to come from new entries
which had been made as a result of World War II and after the time the proceeding was
initiated.
Concerning the possibility of using the antitrust laws in an oligopoly situation,
Assistant Attorney General Donald F. Turner testified before a Senate Committee as
follows:
[A]Ithough it has not yet been done, it may be possible to apply the Sherman
Act to oligopolies. The courts have tended to expand the application of this Act
as they have interpreted it during the past 75 years; there is a tenable theory
under which it could be used to attack oligopolistic concentration. It might be
argued that any firm which has achieved a position in a tightly oligopolized
industry, at least in part through substantial merger or unnecessarily exclusionary
behavior, violates the individual monopolization provisions of section 2 because
it has acquired individual shared monopoly power; it shares, with one or two
other firms in the industry, the power to raise prices above a competitive level.
While action to correct such situations would be economically desirable, the legal
theory does raise serious questions of proper statutory interpretations.
Hearings on the Status and Future of Small Business Before the Select Senate Comm. on
Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 714 (1967).
07
 In merger cases, a structural test has been utilized only when a case was brought
under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 18 (1970). A violation of this section is estab-
lished upon a merger of two corporations if the effect of the merger "may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly" in any line of commerce. In
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), the Supreme Court upheld a
challenge to a merger under § 7, because the two firms together accounted for about
eighty percent of the market. This, the Court concluded, evidenced a trend toward concen-
tration. Id. at 277.
68 The ideas presented in this section were developed to a greater extent in Mac-
Intyre, The Federal Trade Commission's Antitrust Functions: Some Practical Problems in
Enforcement, 14 U.C1A. L. Rev. 997 (1967).
09
 For a typical source of such generalizations, see Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v.
FTC, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966), where the court pointed out that "[i]njury to a
competitor is not the test; the test is injury to competition." Id. at 281.
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mance, thus injuring competition, especially if the predator has sub-
stantial market power."
Yet at present antitrust sanctions are available only when preda-
tory pricing practices involve monopoly or attempts to monopolize or
price discrimination. If these sanctions are to be made more broadly
applicable, as this paper proposes, current standards of antitrust law
must be adapted to measure all predatory pricing activities. Construc-
tion of a test for determining the possible impact of such practices on
competition, i.e., for determining what degree of business diversion will
retard competitor performance, is absolutely essential. This test could
employ criteria analogous to those utilized in antitrust merger litigation
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act," and would emphasize a "viability
of competition" standard as opposed to a competitor standard."
Further, the test must not consist of absolutes, but must encompass
considerations of competitor market power, market structure, and the
number of adversaries on the market." In industries not marred by
heavy concentration or excessive entrance barriers, business diverted
from a few competing sellers would probably be insignificant. However,
a significant degree of business division in highly concentrated in-
dustries could effectively hinder competitor performance and injure
competition. 74 The proposed test must therefore be sufficiently flexible
to reflect such distinctions.
CONCLUSION
In considering the need for predatory pricing legislation, one factor
should be kept firmly in mind—any change in existing laws must be
70 Maclntyre, supra note 68, at 1018. See also Burns, Antitrust and Robinson-Patman
Act Problems: IntraCorporate Problems, 7 Antitrust Bull. 689 (1962), and CeHer, Facts
About Antitrust Myths, 9 Antitrust Bull. 607 (1964).
71 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Section 7 provides in part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . . the whole or any part
of the stock . . . or the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
.. where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. $ 18 (1970) (emphasis added). See also Maclntyre, supra note 68, at 1019.
72 In United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), the
Supreme Court stressed a "viability of competition" standard when it held that "any
acquisition by one corporation of all or any part of the stock of another corporation,
competitor or not, is within the reach of . . . [$ 7 of the Clayton Act] whenever the
reasonable likelihood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint of com-
merce." Id. at 592 (emphasis added). The Court further concluded that "the market
affected must be substantial," and that proof must be affirmed which would show a
"likelihood that competition may be 'foreclosed in a substantial share of . . . [that
market].' " Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
73 Maclntyre, supra note 68, at 1019.
74 Id.
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based on a solid foundation of convincing evidence that such a change
is in fact warranted. The outstanding characteristic of past proposals
aimed at weakening or eliminating predatory pricing laws has been
their lack of supporting empirical data. In contrast, there exists a
wealth of material revealing the need for legislation to combat predatory
pricing practices. It may well be that a thorough analysis of available
data will reveal that a change in the law would be justified and, in light
of the current barrage of criticism directed at the price discrimination
laws, this would appear to be an appropriate time to conduct such an
evaluation. Meanwhile, until this task is undertaken, it must be recog-
nized that proposals for change are grounded in speculation.
Moreover, the argument that incorporation of predatory pricing
legislation within the antitrust laws would be redundant in light of
other antitrust laws is based on an incomplete analysis of these laws.
To fill the void in the present antitrust enforcement scheme, a test
for measuring the injury to competition caused by predatory pricing
practices must be created so that the antitrust laws may be used against
such injury.
20
